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expert testimony would not be admitted. The decision was unclear on
both points and has led to confusion in later cases. The question of whether
particular conduct conforms to the standard of care is clearly one of fact
and the court in Gambert was in error on this point.
At the time of Gambert expert testimony may have had little or no
value on the issue of attorney negligence and though the reasoning in
Gambert was unclear, the decision may have been correct. But in view
of the specialized practice of law today, expert testimony should be ad-
missible whenever the character of the alleged negligent conduct is not
such as to come within the common knowledge of the trier of fact, whether
this be judge or jury; and in proper cases such evidence should be required
of the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case and avoid a non-suit.
Jerry B. Abbott*
0 Member, Second Year Class.
CLIENTS STRATEGY FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE
MALPRACTICING ATTORNEY
Attorney liability for malpractice is but one facet of the broad field of
tort liability for negligence. Thus the general principles of tort law apply
in a suit against a negligent attorney, and the broad outlines may be painted
by utilizing such concepts as duty, standard of care, proximate cause, and
damages. The element of damages merits closer analysis for it presents
several interesting and significant questions: whether the action should be
brought in tort or in contract, the choice or strategy in electing between
these actions, and the difficulty of pleading and proving proximity of dam-
ages. These questions will be considered at some length below.,
Suit in Tort or Contract for Attorney Negligence
There were two theoretically separate and distinct bases for imposing
liability upon a negligent attorney at common law,2 ex delicto and ex con-
tractu. Liability ex delicto has its roots in the concept that an individual
may owe a duty to another to act with reasonable care so as not to harm
his interests, this duty being imposed as a matter of law for reasons of social
policy and not because of any agreement between the parties. 3 This is the
general tort duty for breach of which an action in negligence would lie.
The second liability, ex contractu, arises not as a matter of law but out of
I Since the question of damages will always be ancillary to a finding of negligence,
it will be assumed that there has been found an act of negligence by the attorney.
2 Boorman v. Brown, 3 Q.B. 511, 525, 114 Eng. Rep. 603, 608 (1841):
That there is a large class of cases in which the foundation of the action
springs out of privity of contract between the parties, but in which, nevertheless,
the remedy for the breach, or non-performance, is indifferently either assumpsit
or case upon tort, is not disputed. Such are actions against attorneys, surgeons,
and other professional men, for want of competent skill or proper care in the
service they undertake to render ....
3 See PnossF., TORTS 478 (2d ed. 1955).
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the agreement of the parties that they shall be bound.4 Such an agreement
exists where an attorney expressly engages to act with care, thereby sub-
jecting himself to contract liability for breach of his promise. In addition,
the common law implied a promise to exercise due care in certain employ-
ment agreements: "So, in the case of one who holds out a certain profes-
sion, the law supposes him to be of competent skill, and he is responsible
for any failure in that respect ... From the holding out, the law implies
a contract or a duty to exert competent and reasonable skill."5
The California courts have had occasion to consider this dual aspect of
liability not only in attorney malpractice, but also in medical malpractice,6
accountant negligence,7 and common carrier negligence cases,8 where both
tort and contract duties could be rationalized. The distinction between the
two actions becomes relevant when conflicting rules of pleading," of law,10
and of damages", are pressed by the litigants. The California decisions con-
sidering conflicting rules when there is a dual basis of liability have in the
past been far from consistent. 2 However, these apparently conflicting hold-
ings more recently have been aligned and distinguished with the result
that actions involving personal injury, although containing features of both
contract and tort, are regarded as delictual actions, since negligence is
considered the gravamen of the action; actions which concern only pecu-
niary losses with no personal injury may be brought in either contract or
tort. 3 Attorney malpractice cases fit into this category of "cases which relate
4 See 1 CoRBnr, CoNTRAcTs § 9 (1963).
5 Erle, C. J., in Fish v. Kelly, 17 C.B. (N.S.) 194, 206, 144 Eng. Rep. 78, 83 (C.P.
1864).
6 Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936); Marty v. Somers, 35 Cal.
App. 182, 169 Pac. 411 (1917).
7L. B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 244 P.2d 385 (1952).
8 Basler v. Sacramento Elec., Gas & By. Co., 166 Cal. 33, 134 Pac. 993 (1913).
9 Von Goerlitz v. Turner, 65 Cal. App. 2d 425, 150 P.2d 278 (1944).
1o Lubert v. Chauviteau, 3 Cal. 458 (1853).
11 Miller v. Van Tassel, 24 Cal. 459 (1864).
12 See Pnossnn, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, SELECTED Topics oN THE
LAW OF TORTS 434 (1953), where the author states that the cases considering election
between contract and tort "are in what can only be described as a snarl of utter confusion,
from which no generalization can be derived except that there is almost complete dis-
agreement." In Jones v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251, 280 Pac. 942 (1929), the court said that
the plaintiff may make an election because both contract and tort duties had been
breached; see also Williamson v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 67 Cal. App. 2d 250, 153
P.2d 990 (1944), where it was said that the plaintiff may not make an election because to
allow such would lead to "utter chaos"; in Peterson v. Sherman, 68 Cal. App. 2d 706,
157 P.2d 863 (1945), the court said that where there are both duties present, the pre-
sumption is that the pleadings sound in contract; and Basler v. Sacramento Elec., Gas &
By. Co., 166 Cal. 33, 134 Pac. 993 (1913), stated that whether tort or contract principles
are applicable will be determined by the gravamen of the harm sustained by the plaintiff.
Is Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 663, 328 P.2d 198, 203
(1958):
[I]t is the rule that where a case sounds both in contract and tort the plain-
tiff will ordinarily have freedom of election between an action of tort and one
of contract .... An exception to this rule is made in suits for personal injury
caused by negligence, where the tort character of the action is considered to
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to financial damage" (with perhaps one exception-mental suffering result-
ing from attorney negligence), and it should follow that a client has a free
election to sue in either tort or contract.
California attorney malpractice cases appear to bear out this general
rule. To date the actions which have been sustained have all been brought
in tort. While there has been no case squarely holding that an injured
client can elect to sue for breach of contract, there have been dicta indi-
cating that such is the rule.14 In the Lucas v. Hamm' case it was alleged that
an attorney had negligently drawn a will in an action by the disappointed
intended legatees as third party beneficiaries of his employment contract
with the testator. Recovery was denied because the court found that the
attorney's acts did not constitute negligence. However, the court stated:
'We conclude that intended beneficiaries of a will who lose their testa-
mentary rights because of failure of the attorney who drew the will to prop-
erly fulfill his obligations under his contract with the testator may recover
as third party beneficiaries."' 0 Such a conclusion necessarily implies that
the attorney is liable in contract for his negligence. The court stated fur-
ther that "the attorney, by accepting employment to give legal advice or
to render other legal services, impliedly agrees to use such skill, prudence,
and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess
and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake ...
These principles are equally applicable whether the plaintiff's claim is based
on tort or breach of contract."17 These statements by the highest California
court indicate that the client may sue in either tort or contract.
Criteria for Election
What difference does it make whether the contract or the tort action
is brought? The possibility of recovering a larger sum in damages in tort
will generally suggest that it is the better action. The purpose of allowing
recovery in tort is to compensate the plaintiff for all losses suffered by him,
the only restriction being that the damages must be proximately caused.' 8
However, in contract actions for damages the purpose of recovery is to
give the plaintiff the benefit of the contract, and accordingly a further
restriction is added.19 Applying the familiar rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,20
prevail... but no such exception is applied in cases ... which relate to financial
damage.
14Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960); Moser v.
Western Harness Racing Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1948); Armstrong v.
Adams, 102 Cal. App. 677, 283 Pac. 871 (1929).
Is 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961).
Is Id. at 591, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825, 364 P.2d at 689.
17 Ibid.
Is McCormick, Contemplation Rule as a Limitation Upon Damages for Breach of
Contract, 19 MINN. L.R. 497 (1935).
19 Ibid.
209 Exch. 341, 23 L.J. Ex. 179, 23 L.T.O.S. 69 (1854). The owner of a grist
mill sued a carrier for delay in delivering to a manufacturer broken pieces of a shaft.
The grist mill was shut down pending arrival of the new shaft to be modeled after the
broken pieces. The court held that the mill owner could not recover from the carrier
for damages caused by the shut-down because the carrier was not apprised that mill
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the damages must be such as reasonably could have been contemplated by
the parties at the time they contracted. In many of the problems which an
attorney is hired to solve, the harm which would result from negligent per-
formance would be not only proximate but also contemplated by the parties,
so that recoverable damages would be the same in both actions. Examples
might be where an attorney is hired to litigate a case, to make collections,
to prosecute an appeal, or to file a security lien. In each case, the harm
which would proximately result from the negligence would be the amount
contemplated by the parties, and the damages recoverable would be the
same in either action.
If the problem presented to the attorney concerned the drafting of a
contract, however, negligence in its preparation might lead to greater proxi-
mate damage than was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties
when they made the contract. For example, the attorney might be requested
by the client to draw a contract for the purchase of real property. Through
the negligence of the attorney the contract is not effective and the client
does not obtain the property. The property has in the meantime unex-
pectedly appreciated, resulting in substantial lost profits to the client. The
damages would be proximate but might not be contemplated; in this situa-
tion the client should obviously pursue a tort rather than the alternative
contract remedy. The contemplation rule is a narrower restriction than the
proximate result rule. The conclusion is that while tort damages possibly
might amount to more, they would never be less than contract damages.
The action would best be brought in tort unless one of the factors noted
below suggests the alternative contract remedy.
Contributory Negligence
One aspect of a case which might induce a client to sue the negligent
attorney in contract rather than tort is a factual situation suggesting that
contributory negligence of the client will be an issue.21 Withholding infor-
mation, misinforming, refusing to cooperate, or failing to follow the direc-
tions of the attorney might constitute contributory fault.. This defense was
held to be available to a negligent attorney in the case of Theobald v.
Byers, 22 the court drawing analogy to medical malpractice cases where con-
tributory negligence is a proper defense.23 Although holding that there had
been no contributory negligence as a matter of law (reversing the lower
court's finding of fact), the upper court said that "there would seem to be
no reason whatever why the same rule should not be applicable in a legal
malpractice action where there is evidence that a client chose to disregard
the legal advice of his attorney. In our opinion, any other rule would be
grossly unfair. The trial court was correct in holding that contributory
operation depended on delivery of the shaft. Liability will not be imposed for damage
which was not contemplated by the parties at the time they made the contract. Accord,
Hunt Bros. Co. v. San Lorenzo Water Co., 150 Cal. 51, 87 Pac. 1093 (1906).
21 See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 17 (1960).
22 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961).
23See Preston v. Hubbell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 196 P.2d 113 (1948); Sales v. Baci-
galupi, 47 Cal. App. 2d 82, 117 P.2d 399 (1941); Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal. App. 404,
3 P.2d 1023 (1931).
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negligence could properly be considered a defense in the instant case."24
While facts entitling the attorney to this defense would be sufficient
to bar completely any recovery in tort,25 they might not have this effect
in a contract action. Suppose, for example, the client has withheld informa-
tion or evidence from his attorney which has contributed to the loss of the
case. To the attorney's promise of due care there should be an implied
counter-promise of co-operation by the client that he will disclose all the
facts. 21 The effect of a failure to comply with this promise could be resolved
in several ways. First, as suggested by Williston, it might be said that a
client cannot recover damages "because of a doctrine which suggests both
contributory negligence and a requirement of equity. One who is himself
guilty of a wrong for breach of a contract, it may be said, should not seek
to hold his counter-promisor liable."27 Secondly, the counter-promise might
be treated as a condition, i.e., the attorney's duty of performance is condi-
tioned upon the client's co-operation.28 If the act by the client was a material
breach of his implied promise of co-operation, then under either tort or
contract doctrine the attorney would be excused from liability.29 However,
a non-material breach by the client would be a complete defense in a tort
action (contributory negligence) while in a contract action it would go
merely to reduce the damages proximately attributable to the attorney.30
Third, the two implied promises might be enforced as independent obliga-
tions, no effect as a defense being given them.81 The attorney would be
liable only for that amount which he proximately caused, regardless of
whether the breach was material.
It is clear that the contract action leaves more latitude for arguing that
the attorney should be liable even in the presence of contributing fault by
the client. The client might be well advised to preclude the complete
defense of contributory negligence, where it is an issue, by suing in a con-
tract action.
Survival of Actions
The common law rule concerning survival of actions was that a contract
action could be maintained even after the death of either of the parties
to the contract, while an action for personal injuries was abated by the
death of either the injured party or. the torffeasor 3 2 California has provided
by statute that "no cause of action shall be lost by reason of the death of
any person but may be maintained by or against his executor or adminis-
trator."33 Thus survival of actions, a once important distinction between tort
and contract, is now of no import and should not bear upon the choice of
actions in suing the negligent attorney.
24 193 Cal. App. 2d at 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
2
5 PRossEn, TORTS 284 (2d ed. 1955).28 See 6 WmLISTON, CoCTrAcis § 887 (3d ed. 1962).
27 Id. § 813. See also 4 CoRaN, CoNaTAcTs § 947 (1951).
28 6 WrLISTON, CoNTRACTs § 887 (3d ed. 1962).
29 Id. § 814; 4 CoRnsN, CoNTrAcrs § 946 (1951).
304 CoaRnN, CoNTaAcTs §§ 946, 1253 (1951).316 WmnsToN, CoNmAcTs § 813 (3d ed. 1962).
82 PNossa, ToRTs 706 (2d ed. 1955); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1211 (1960).
33 CAr.. PROB. CoDE § 573.
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Venue
The possibility of determining venue by choice of action, while some-
what limited, might be a factor militating in favor of electing a contract
remedy. The advantages to be gained by an alternative venue could include,
among others: a minimization of one's own and maximization of the opposi-
tion's expense and inconvenience; advantages of trial in familiar surround-
ings in the presence of known judicial personnel; availability of compulsory
process, thereby securing greater effectiveness of live testimony as compared
with deposition evidence; and delay.
In a tort action, venue is that of the defendant's residence unless there
is physical injury;34 if there is physical injury the plaintiff will have the
option of maintaining the action in the venue where the injury occurred.35
Since physical injury is not usually present in a malpractice suit against
an attorney, the client is limited in a tort action to a venue set by the defend-
ants residence.
In a contract action, however, the client conceivably could choose among
three different venues: (1) where the defendant resides, (2) where the
contract is to be performed, and (3) where the contract for retaining the
attorney is entered into-but where the contract is entered into is deemed
to be the same as where the contract is to be performed unless there is a
special term in the contract to the contrary.36 The client-attorney contract
likely would not have such a term, but the client is still left with a venue
choice not available in a tort action, that of the county where the contract
is to be performed. If this varies from where the defendant-attorney resides,
therein lies a possible advantage for the client in choosing a contract action
over the tort action. While seemingly a small difference, under the proper
factual situation such a difference might be a determining factor in the
choice.
Attachment
The rule has been well established that attachment will not issue in a
tort action.3 7 Further, this provisional action will not be permitted in a
contract action unless, as provided by statute, the contract (express or
implied) sued upon is "for the direct payment of money." 8 The contract
on which the client would base his action is one of due care and not one
for the payment of money, and therefore attachment would not be avail-
able .3 Could it be argued for the sake of securing attachment that the
promise to use due care contains an implied promise of indemnity for any
damages which result from failure to use due care? If so, then perhaps
34 CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 395.
35Mason v. Buck, 99 Cal. App. 219, 278 Pac. 461 (1929); see also WriN, CAm-
FOrNIA PRocEDURE Actions §§ 213, 219 (1954).
36 CAL. CODE Crv. Poc. § 395.
37 Hill v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 527, 106 P.2d 876 (1940); San Francisco
Iron & Metal Co. v. Abraham, 211 Cal. 552, 296 Pac. 82 (1931).
38 CAL. CoDE Crv. lNoc. § 537(1).
39 This is true if only the attorney is a resident. CAL. CODE Crv. Phoc. § 537(2),
(3) provide broader rights of attachment against non-residents in tort actions and also
in contract actions not necessarily for direct payment of money.
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this implied promise of indemnity could come within the code provision.
While the decisions concerning the provision have liberally expanded its
meaning,40 to imply a promise of indemnity seems to go far beyond the
legislature's intent to limit attachment.
Statute of Limitations
The California courts have uniformly held 4' that the statute applicable
in an action against a negligent attorney is Code of Civil Procedure section
339, limiting to two years the time for bringing "an action upon a contract,
obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing,"42 the
cases making no clear distinction between a contract and a tort action. They
have simply stated that under this section the cause of action is barred at
the expiration of two years after the negligence occurred. It would seem
unnecessary to determine, however, whether a negligence action against
an attorney is considered as a breach of contract or as a tort in California.
The word "liability" used in section 339 is interpreted to include all torts
not involving personal injury or death and, therefore, either action would be
governed by the two-year limitation."3
All the attorney malpractice cases which have dealt with the limitation
problem have presumably based the duty owed and breached upon an oral
contract. Some speculation must be indulged in to complete the statute
of limitations picture since no cases have been found concerning written
contracts. First, if the employment contract is a written instrument and
contains a written condition that the attorney agrees to use care and skill,
it clearly would seem that the contract would come within the four-year
statute which applies to "an action upon any contract, obligation or liability
founded upon an instrument in writing."44 Hence, a contract action should
be brought in the circumstances where the attorney has made a written
condition of care and more than two years has elapsed since the negligent
act. Secondly, this should be distinguished from the case where there is
a written contract of employment with no express term of care and skill,
this condition being implied by the court Generally, the California posi-
tion as regards the limitation applicable to an implied contract or term
within a written contract is that while any written terms of the contract will
come within the four-year provision of section 337, any implied term merely
supported by that contract will fall within the two-year limitation of sec-
tion 339.45 It should be borne in mind that these represent the general rules
40 Comment, 14 HASTiNGS L.J. 38 (1962).
41 Hays v. Ewing, 70 Cal. 127, 11 Pae. 602 (1886); Griffith v. Zavlaris, 215 A.C.A.
923, 30 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1963); DeGarmo v. Mayo, 4 Cal. App. 2d 604, 41 P.2d 366
(1935); Wheaton v. Nolan, 3 Cal. App. 2d 401, 39 P.2d 457 (1934); Jensen v. Sprigg,
84 Cal. App. 519, 258 Pac. 683 (1927).4 2 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 339.
43 Lowe v. Ozmun, 137 Cal. 257, 70 Pac. 87 (1902); Piller v. Southern Pac. Ry.,
52 Cal. 42 (1877); Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163
(1954); Italiani v. Metro-Coldwyn-Mayer Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 464, 114 P.2d 370
(1941).
4 4 CAL. CODE CrV. PROC. § 337.
45 See O'Brien v. King, 174 Cal. 769, 164 Pac. 631 (1917); Thomas v. Pacific
Beach Co., 115 Cal. 136, 46 Pac. 899 (1896); Ashley v. Vischer, 24 Cal. 322 (1864).
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for written contracts and for implied contracts. The only cases which have
specifically considered the statute of limitations in attorney malpractice
suits have applied the two year limitation, presumably because the duty
was based on an oral contract.46
Damages "Proximately Caused"
Whether the action is ex deliCto7 or ex contractu,8 in order to state a
cause of action and thereby recover a judgment, the client must show that
he has sustained damages and that these damages were proximately caused
by the attorney. It is this element of pleading and proving proximate causa-
tion which has proved to be a stumbling block for the client-plaintiff.
Pleading
The early cases of attorney malpractice required an overly strict plead-
ing of proximate cause,49 but this is no longer so. This requirement was a
logical outgrowth of the way the proximate cause rule was stated. Rather
than declaring that the attorney's negligence must be a "proximate cause,"
the early courts stated the rule in the familiar "but for" form50 The "but
for" rule implies that nothing else shall have caused the damage, i.e., that
the harm must be caused solely by the attorney's negligence. This was
clearly stated in McGregor v. Wright51 where the rule was set down that the
attorney's act must be the "sole and proximate cause" and that any loss
suffered must be "caused solely" by his negligence. The effect of requiring
the client to show that the damages resulted solely from the attorney's
negligence or that he would not have suffered the loss but for the negligence
is to suggest that the client must exclude and negative all other possible
See also McCarthy v. Mt. Tecarte Land & W. Co., 111 Cal. 328, 340, 43 Pac. 956, 959
(1896): "In order to be founded upon an instrument in writing, the instrument must,
itself, contain a contract to do the thing for the nonperformance of which the action was
brought." Scrivner v. Woodward, 139 Cal. 314, 316, 73 Pac. 863 (1903): "Promises
merely implied by law, and not supported by any express promise or stipulation in the
written instrument, do not fall within the provision of section 337, relating to contracts
in writing."46 E.g., Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 30 Pac. 545 (1892); Hays v. Ewing, 70 Cal.
127, 11 Pac. 602 (1886); DeGarmo v. Mayo, 4 Cal. App. 2d 604, 41 P.2d 366 (1935);
Wheaton v. Nolan, 3 Cal. App. 2d 401, 39 P.2d 457 (1934); Jensen v. Sprigg, 84 Cal.
App. 519, 258 Pac. 683 (1927); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 1216, 1221 (1956).
4 7 CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3333.
48 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300.
49 1 Wr-KN, CALiFonIA PROCEDURE Attorneys § 76 (1954).
50 In Hastings v. Halleck, 13 Cal. 204 (1859), it was held that in order to charge
the defendant attorney with negligence in failing to set up a defense in a prior suit,
the client must show the facts which would have constituted the defense, that these
facts were provable, and that the case would have been won "but for" the attorney's
negligence. In Lally v. Kuster, 177 Cal. 783, 787, 171 Pac. 961, 962 (1918), it was
asserted that the attorney had negligently failed to bring an action to collect a debt;
the court quoted 6 C.J. Attorney & Client § 260 (1916) saying the client must show
that the attorney was negligent "and that, but for such negligence, the debt could, or
would, have been collected."
5' 117 Cal. App. 186, 196, 3 P.2d 624, 628 (1931).
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causes for the damage which resulted52 This strict pleading requirement
did not conform to the general rule that a plaintiff should not anticipate
defenses in the complaint."3 The result was to give the defendant-attorney
a pleading advantage not given defendants in other types of negligence
actions.
Not until 1954 in Modica v. Crist 4 was it held that allegation and proof
of sole causation is not required and that the use of the "but for" clause
in the previous cases was just one method of expressing the need of proxi-
mate causation. The court declared that the pleading of proximate cause
in attorney negligence is the same as in any other negligence action, that
is, that it may be pleaded generally. Since this case, the pleading of proxi-
mate cause in attorney negligence should present no greater problem than
in other negligence actions.
Proof of Proximate Damages
Though it is no longer necessary to allege sole causation, the plaintiff-
client still must be prepared to prove that the earlier trial or legal claim
which the attorney negligently lost was meritorious. If the legal claim
presented to the attorney by the client would not permit him to litigate
it successfully, then even if he was negligent in handling the matter, the
damages are a proximate result of the unmeritorious legal claim and not
of the attorney's negligence. Only if there is a valid claim may the client
suffer damage from the attorney's acts. Therefore, the trial court in the
malpractice action will review the previous case, consider the earlier evi-
dence, and apply the proper law to it to determine whether the client has
lost a valid claim or defense or whether the case would have been lost on
the merits or law regardless of any attorney negligence. It will involve,
in a sense, a suit within a suit. Thus, where a client sued his attorney for
the inconvenience and embarrassment suffered because the attorney negli-
gently failed to put forward a defense available to the client in a contempt
proceeding, the court reconsidered the original proceeding and held that
since the defense which the attorney could have interposed was not suscep-
tible of proof, the client could not recover against the attorney.55
The necessity of relitigating the issues in the previous case was clearly
brought out in Pete v. Henderson.," The client asserted the negligence of
the attorney in failing to file a notice of appeal in a previous action in which
a judgment had been rendered against the client as a judgment debtor. The
client attempted to show that the appeal would have been good and, there-
fore, that the damages which resulted were caused by the attorney's negli-
52 See Feldesman v. McGovern, 44 Cal. App. 2d 566, 112 P.2d 645 (1941), where
the client alleged that the attorney was negligent in failing to file a bankruptcy petition.
The court held that the client failed to state a cause of action because he had not alleged
that had the petition been ified, he would have been entitled to an adjudication of
bankruptcy. The client failed to exclude other possible causes of the damage in his
allegations.
53 See generally 2 Wrran, CAxLIoRwIA. PaocEnuRE Pleading § 195 (1954).
54 129 Cal. App. 2d 144, 276 P.2d 614 (1954).
55 Frost v. Hanscome, 198 Cal. 550, 246 Pac. 53 (1926).
58 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954).
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gence in failing to appeal and not by the merits of the case. The judge
emphatically refused to permit any discussion of evidence relating to the
merits of the appeal in the original action, his position being that this
would constitute a collateral attack on the judgment and that he could not
consider what might have happened to the appeal if one had been perfected.
This was held to be error on appeal, the court pointing out the need for
a reconsideration of the original suit and indicating further that this was
not a collateral attack.5 7 An attorney malpractice action then, involves a
suit within a suit, a reconsideration of the previous legal claim, and only
by determining whether or not the original claim was good can proximate
damages be determined.
Conclusion
It may be seen that one who has been financially injured by the negi-
gent actions of his attorney may recover this amount by a suit for damages.
The client may elect between a tort remedy or one in contract in order to
maximize his recovery, but in this strategy he will want to consider the
possible effects of venue changes, contributory negligence, and the statute
of limitations. Further, while pleading should be no more difficult than in
other negligence actions, proof that damages were proximately caused by
the negligent attorney does require the client to be prepared to show that
the previous claim was good. The client must prove, in effect, one suit
within the other.
Suggesting in what way a client may obtain full damages against his
attorney is not to be interpreted as a general encouragement of attorney
malpractice suits. Yet an attorney should be subject to the same duty of
care required of others and for his failure in this respect should have visited
upon him the damages he has caused. Not only will this facilitate justice
by shifting the loss from the innocent party, but further, it will serve to
vindicate the integrity of the bar and encourage respect for the legal
profession.
Lynn P. Bartlett*
57 Id. at 490, 269 P.2d at 79:
Such proof would not constitute a collateral attack on the judgment. The
judgment in the first action, as between the parties to that action, is final. The
purpose of the present action is not to reverse that judgment. It has been finally
determined that the judgment creditor in the first action is entitled to that
money. The appellant is not trying to regain recoupment from the judgment
creditor. He is seeking to recover damages from his attorney, who is not a party
to the first action, for his negligence in permitting the judgment to become final
without taking an appeal. If he can prove that the judgment in that case is
erroneous and would have been reversed, he should be permitted to do so.
In that event he has proved damage proximately caused by the negligence.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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